evaluating their quality (for examples, see Ferrell, 1985; Hogarth, 1977 Hogarth, , 1978 Sniezek & Henry, 1989 . Some of these works (Ferrell, 1985; Hill, 1982; Sniezek & Henry, 1989 ) note specific conditions or situations under which the mathematical models are superior. Two important assumptions made by many of these studies are that (a) there are error components in judgments made for tasks requiring an estimate of an unknown quantity and (b) the solicitation of multiple estimates for the unknown quantity can reveal the parameters of the distribution of the errors. The studies are concerned with discovering techniques that identify and reduce the errors and identifying the conditions under which various techniques are superior. The large number of ways to combine individual opinions, judgments, or information has led to no small amount of complexity in reviews of the literature on this subject (see Davis, 1992; Hastie, 1986; Hill, 1982; Levine & Moreland, 1990) .
Because of the difficulty associated with mathematically combining individual opinions on some decision tasks, researchers have often used structured discussion and/or identification of best individuals rather than mathematical aggregation as a method of combining individual opinions in these situations (Henry, 1993 (Henry, , 1995 Reagan-Cirincione, 1994) . Some studies focus on examining the means by which group members behaviorally combine their opinions to form group opinions and the relative performance of individuals and groups on problem-solving and decision-making tasks. The findings in this area are voluminous and contradictory. Some researchers (Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klempner, 1977; Henry, 1993 Henry, , 1995 Hill, 1982; Libby, Trotman, & Zimmer, 1987; ReaganCirincione, 1994; Steiner, 1972; Yetton & Bottger, 1982) have argued that a single group member can perform as well or better than a group for many complex decision-making tasks. Others (Argote, Seabright, & Dyer, 1986; Bazerman, Guiliano, & Appelman, 1984) argue that groups show more evidence of decision biases than do individuals. Others (Laughlin & McGlynn, 1986; Stasser, Kerr, & Davis, 1989) show that groups perform better than the average individual. Still others argue that under certain conditions groups perform better than any individual member (Michaelson, Watson, & Black, 1989) .
Some research combines the two previously discussed traditions. For example, Hill (1982) , Rohrbaugh (1979 Rohrbaugh ( , 1981 , Steiner (1972) , and Yetton and Bottger (1982) argue that the best individual member performs better than a mathematical technique, which performs better than the individual with the average level of perfor-mance. Hill (1982) states the tradition in this stream of research as follows:
This review has shown that group performance was generally qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the performance of the average individual. Group performance, however, was often inferior to that of the best individual in a statistical aggregate and often inferior to the potential suggested by a statistical pooling model. (p. 535) Sniezek and Henry (1989) argue that, in some cases, the free interaction of individuals can create estimates that are superior to those created by mathematical aggregation of individual responses. They argue that the use of aggregation techniques that employ statistical methods are only valuable for those decisions in which estimates are distributed appropriately around the correct value.
A PROBLEM WITH PREVIOUS STUDIES
One problem with existing studies that use mathematical combination of opinions is that they often use unrepresentative, highly abstract (or both) experimental tasks. They frequently rely on judgments that are not significant to practical decision makers, and even more often they involve decisions or judgments (such as estimating the number of items in a jar) of a single quantity or value. Though these experimental procedures increase the tractability of experimental design and analysis, they also reduce the applicability of results to many decision situations, particularly those encountered by practicing managers. The lack of applicability has perhaps limited the interest of many management professionals.
Another problem with studies that examine complex decisions is that they frequently use a measure of quality based purely on the opinions of expert judges. Though the use of expert opinion represents an important start to the research on decision quality, it can be 190 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / April 1999 limited for some types of decisions. In order for researchers to meaningfully evaluate some management decisions, those decisions should be conducted using quantities and criteria for evaluation that are meaningful for a managerial or decision-making population. This would make the results more general and more convincing to managers. As Michaelson et al. (1989) have argued, it is essential for groups to stay together for substantial periods of time, to work on meaningful tasks, and to work toward real rewards for their efforts to find some group-based effects. They tacitly suggest that this type of experimental approach should be used more often. Davis (1992) also argues, To be sure many small group work environments and associated task structures have even now not been thoroughly studied. Groups specially trained and organized for simultaneous work on subtasks and long-term groups of experts dedicated to protracted periods of work, punctuated by periods of rest or alternative effort, are among the examples that have yet to be subjected to thorough empirical study. (p. 9)
EXTENDING PAST RESEARCH
This article represents an effort to come to grips with these limitations in past research by attempting to take research on the mathematical combination of opinions and move it a step toward the complexity and realism of in vivo decision making. It also attempts to follow the suggestions of Milliken and Vollrath (1991) to improve the existing empirical knowledge of the strategic management of organizations by examining the process of complex decision making as an instance of small group decision making. This research proposes a new type of test of the previously discussed generalization regarding the mathematical combination of multiple judgements. It argues that group judgements can be mathematically combined in the same way as can those of individuals. Furthermore, it agues that the quality of judgements created by mathematically combining sets of group opinions can be evaluated in a manner similar to that used in the individual decision-making literature. This follows the work of Laughlin and Hollingshead (1996) and Laughlin and Shupe (1996) , who draw a distinction between intragroup collective induction and intergroup collective induction. They argue that intergroup collective induction is relevant to tasks that are complex enough to require the efforts of multiple groups.
Given an appropriate means for combining group decisions, it is possible to consider distributing individuals into independent, functional, or cross-functional groups to make judgement or decision tasks more tractable. This is particularly important when decisions can be made only through the combined efforts of many individuals with highly specialized knowledge. It is also important in situations in which problems or judgmental tasks are so complex or require so much effort that a single individual cannot reasonably achieve a solution in an appropriate period of time.
In these situations, it might be important to employ some structured procedure to combine the efforts from several groups for a number of reasons. Groups are prone to polarize the risk predispositions of individual members (see Bazerman, 1994 for a recent summary of research) and produce decisions that are either too risky or too conservative. Groups may be more prone to arbitrary persistence in face of evidence that a strategy is failing (Whyte, 1993) . Groups may be subject to normative influences that cause them to ignore the expertise of some knowledgeable members (Cosier & Schwenk, 1990) . Groups may be prone to take courses of action with which all members secretly disagree (Harvey, 1974) . In situations in which there are time constraints on decision processes, groups may compensate for the longer discussion times required for group process by using quicker, suboptimal decision procedures. Group discussion alone may not be able to reduce the biases inherent in the decision-making practices of individuals. In situations in which groups must rely on individual expertise for some facet of a multiparameter decision, group decisions may be subject to the same imperfections as individual decisions. The imperfections in the decisions of the individuals with unique expertise may be compounded by the need for their decisions to mesh with those of others to form a coherent, multiparameter decision.
In many of these situations, a means by which the products of many group efforts can be combined to determine a single course of action might result in improved judgements. For complex tasks in which judgments can be expressed as a set of numerical parameters, some form of mathematical aggregation could be potentially valuable. Mathematical aggregation at the group level can incorporate some of the previously discussed advantages of interactive, within-group discussion and it can simultaneously incorporate some of the previously discussed advantages of mathematical aggregation of decisions. Not all decisions or judgments can be rendered into mathematical forms, of course, but it is reasonable to assume that many such decision problems exist.
To discuss how to combine efforts from multiple groups, it is necessary to outline how judgments can be mathematically combined in the case of a multifaceted or multivalued decision. A discussion of this procedure, along with a formal statement of a hypothesis implied by the procedure, is given in the next section.
AGGREGATING RESPONSES
In many instances, the products of a complex decision process consist of a vector of numerical values, each element of which consists of the decision about one part of a multidimensional or multifaceted decision. For example a n ; n = 1, . . . , N
represents a decision when each a n is a value, such as a sales target for a particular product, the amount of money budgeted for a particular expense center, a planned amount of production for a particular product, and so forth. When many parameters of a decision must be decided at once (such as in a budgeting process or a production plan) the elements of the vector constitute the product of one group decision process. The opinions of more than one decision-making group working on the same problem can be represented as a matrix in which row refers to a specific group and column refers to a component of a Dougan / MATHEMATICAL AGGREGATION STRATEGIES 193 decision. A way of denoting a particular value in one of these matrices is given by a in ; I = 1, . . . , I; n = 1, . . . , N,
where i is the referent for the group making the decision n is the referent for a particular component of the decision I is the number of groups taking part in the decision N is the number of separate components needed to complete each multidimensional decision.
AGGREGATED JUDGMENTS
A combined judgment for a number of groups, composed for example by mathematically aggregating the opinions of a number of groups regarding a particular decision, might be given by the vector 
A different form of aggregating the individual group decisions could also be given the following vector A′ .n = median a in ; for each n.
The techniques identified above are based on the assumption that the true or best value for each component of a decision (that is, the value that is most appropriate for a given decision situation) is hidden in a distribution of errors made by each of the decision groups. The aggregation of the judgements from all groups statistically removes the random error portion from each component of the decision, leaving a quantity more likely to be closer to the true or best value.
This argument about centrality may be disputed, of course, because extreme responses sometimes signal a change in thinking or a new approach similar to a successful mutation in a biological 194 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / April 1999 population (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) . This is true, but such actions generally require profound changes in how decision groups approach their tasks. They often involve an introduction of new decision variables, new approaches and actions that are usually reflective of paradigmatic change. Although there is evidence that a mutation will be the source of extreme success, there is also evidence that a very large proportion of such mutations are unsuccessful (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) .
Using medians as a way of removing the errors is arguably better, because it is less sensitive to disruptions caused by extreme or spurious judgments on the part of a single group. This is because the technique that uses averaging is based on an assumption that the distribution of errors in the judgments provided by the individuals is normally distributed. Because there is no a priori reason to assume the distributions have this character, a technique that does not rely on the assumption is likely to be more efficient statistically in situations in which it does not hold. In other words, the median is a more robust estimator of the unknown value given that there is some question about the normality of the underlying distribution of responses. Therefore, it should produce a decision superior to the technique that uses means. The reduction of efficiency in the mean as an estimator of the first moment of a distribution is quite pronounced in the presence of any contaminating influences, such as mistakes, errors, or spurious observations. Because the distribution is based on human judgements in the case of demanding and complicated problems and answers may be influenced by politics or error, it is reasonable to assume that there might be problems with underlying distributions.
RELEVANT JUDGMENTS
Of course all group performances might not be improved by a procedure that eliminates or reduces the effects of outliers on the distributions of group responses. Tasks that require creativity, for example, might not be served by such an approach. For decisions that require simultaneous judgments on multiple parameters, mathematical aggregation might be a good approach, however. Extremity Dougan / MATHEMATICAL AGGREGATION STRATEGIES 195 on any of the parameters in a multiple-parameter judgment has a much higher probability of affecting the quality of the whole judgment. Certainly, some parameters (e.g., production plans) might have more profound effects than others, but performance would likely be a function of the whole ensemble of choices and would thus be sensitive to any deviation on a parameter. Thus, it makes sense that techniques of mathematically combining multipleparameter judgments by groups would be at least worth investigating for problems with numerical parameters.
PREDICTING THE RELATIVE QUALITY OF DECISIONS
Each vector of values, whether it is created by a real group or by a statistical combination of groups, will result in a measure of performance, P = F(a i ). The performance outcomes for each of the individual group decisions (a in where I = 1, . . . ,I) can be compared with each of the two types of mathematically combined decisions (A .n and A′ .n ) on each of a number of performance measures. The arguments presented above, about the relative performance of individuals and groups, suggest the following hypothesis:
The quality of the four previously mentioned types of decisions will fall in any order except the following:
METHOD
The next three sections discuss how the hypothesis was tested. Four major topics are addressed in these sections. They are (a) a description of the simulation used as the experimental task, (b) a description of the decisions that the groups made, (c) a discussion of the groups themselves, and (d) a general discussion of the measures that were taken from the participants.
USING A SIMULATION TO SOLICIT GROUP DECISIONS
The group decision-making task used in this research was identical for all the groups. Each of the groups was required to formulate its own response to a problem in strategic management and to express that response in the form of quantitative policies for the next period of operation of a firm. A computer simulation model of a small producer of two industrial commodity products was used as a basis for group decisions. All groups were given identical background information about the industry and the simulated firm they were to manage and were asked to make decisions about a number of policies over a number of quarterly iterations. The simulation was conducted as a part of a MBA course in business policy.
The simulation was designed to economically mimic the conditions found in the ball and roller-bearing industries. In addition to its use in business policy classes, it was used in conjunction with management training courses conducted by the American Bankers Association. It was not designed or chosen with prior knowledge of the hypothesis stated in this study. The simulation involved decisions of the groups over a number of periods, but only the decisions from the first period were examined for the purposes of this study. However, the participants were aware of the fact that their performance was dependent on high quality decisions throughout the simulation, so they were well aware of the need to produce high-quality decisions from the start.
INCENTIVES
To increase the external validity of the hypothesis tests, incentives were provided as a means of motivating the participants in the simulation. Subjects were informed about the two following conditions at the start of the simulation. First, they were told that participation in the simulation was required and that a portion of their grade in the course was dependent on the ability of a group to justify the management decisions they made. There was incentive, then, for the decisions to be good ones (i.e., to be defensible and to generate positive financial outcomes, so the job of defending them was easier). This notion is consistent with arguments made by such researchers as March and Feldman (1981) , Pfeffer (1981) , and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) , who suggest that managers may be selected as much for their ability to rationalize events as for their ability to make economically appropriate decisions.
Second, subjects were told that the simulation was to be run as a contest. There was a collective prize, dinner at a local restaurant, for members of the group with the highest performance at the end of the competition. Performance was determined on the basis of a measure of risk-adjusted return calculated using (a) change in stock price from the beginning to the end of a period and (b) the amount of dividends paid. The change in stock price was based on rational expectations models of the behavior of investors in capital markets. The complexity of the simulation model precludes an exhaustive listing of the underlying program here, but because the model was the same for all groups, the relative performance of those groups can be compared.
A DESCRIPTION OF DECISIONS REQUIRED IN THE SIMULATION
The simulation placed a group of decision makers (group size = 5 members for 17 groups, 6 members for two groups, and 4 members for one group) in the position of a new management committee taking over control of the previously described manufacturing organization. Each group of decision makers (there were a total of 20) was required to make quarterly operating decisions. Operating 198 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / April 1999 decisions for period t + 1 were made after receiving standard accounting statements in period t. As was stated previously, the simulation involved a number of periods, but the test of the previously stated hypothesis was made with data from the first period of the simulation.
Decisions were entered into the simulation in the form of a vector of 17 values. These values corresponded to levels of certain policy parameters normally set by the individual or individuals responsible for operating performance in a business firm (for example, the amount of the next period's advertising budget, the amount of the next period's budget for plant and equipment, the planned production quota for the next period, the planned pricing policy for the next period, etc.). A listing of the individual components of an input is given in Table 1 .
Each quarterly operating decision (or strategy), in the form of a vector of values, became an input for a closed-form, deterministic computer program that calculated the outcome of the particular strategy. The outcomes were reported in a new set of standard accounting statements describing the financial position of each of the firms. The accounting statements were calculated on the basis of a conceptual model of the economic behavior of a firm that derived from a number of assumptions. These included (a) assumptions about the effects of important parameters of the firms' economic environment (e.g., inflation rates, interest rates, real growth of GNP, etc.) on financial outcomes, (b) generally accepted accounting principles, and (c) a series of assumptions about the effects of out-of-pocket expenses for marketing, financial management, and research and development on the demand and production functions of the firms.
The environmental parameters were selected as a way of encapsulating the effects of the general economic environment (i.e., the current economic environment as of the time when the simulation was being conducted) on the firms. The parameters included were (a) the marginal tax rate for corporations, (b) the prime lending rate, (c) the AA bond rate, (d) the commercial paper rate, (e) the Standard and Poor's rate of return (the rate of return on the Standard and Poor's 425), (f) the consumer price index, and (g) an index of Dougan / MATHEMATICAL AGGREGATION STRATEGIES 199 industrial production for each quarter. Generally accepted accounting principles were used to create the pro forma financial statements.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECISION GROUPS
The 102 participants in the study consisted of MBA students in two large business policy courses. These participants were assigned to groups at random, with 18 groups having 5 members and 2 groups having 6 members. Before the start of the study, one of the members of a five-person group left the course and the school for medical reasons, leaving only four persons in that group. Because group assignments already had been announced, it was decided to leave the groups as they were originally composed. The participants were part of the same cohort group and knew each other (sometimes quite well) before the start of the study. This is arguably similar to what happens when a decision group is composed in an actual organization.
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
As was pointed out earlier, performance measures most appropriate for determining which decision is best should be based on 200 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / April 1999 The following decisions are made for each of two products for the next period of operation:
Amount spent on marketing Amount spent on cost research and development Amount spent on capacity research and development Price per unit of goods shipped Number of units produced The following decisions are made for the whole firm for the next period of operations:
Amount spent on payroll for financial management Amount to be spent for new plant and equipment Amount of the line of credit Dividends paid (per share) Long-term debt to be issued New issues of equity The rate of retirement of debt (as a % of the total amount) actual performance data. The most important measure of performance is the measure of risk-adjusted return. This measure is the one criterion on which participants knew they were being judged. It is, therefore, the criterion on which participants concentrated a great deal of their attention. For these reasons, it should be given substantial weight in evaluation of the quality of the decisions.
There are a number of other measures of performance that also can be used to evaluate the merits of the decisions. These are measures that are frequently used to measure the quality of business organizations in other contexts. They also can be included, because they are related to the criterion on which groups were judged. Participants (if they were socialized at all as students of management) knew that superior performance on these factors would eventually result in an increment in performance on risk-adjusted return. Together with risk-adjusted return, these measures comprise the following list:
1. Risk adjusted return of stock; 2. Net income; 3. Change in book value of firm; 4. Change in stock price; 5. Return on assets; 6. Return on equity.
All six measures determine the values of p = F(a i ) discussed previously. At the end of the first period of the simulation, each decision is ranked on each of the measures and the scores of the top group and median group on each of the performance measures are noted. Scores for each of the two statisticized groups are also noted. The hypotheses that follow then use the resultant measures of performance to investigate the usefulness of the two aggregation techniques.
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS
The performance scores for each of the statisticized groups were obtained by calculating the statisticized responses using the Dougan / MATHEMATICAL AGGREGATION STRATEGIES 201 procedures suggested in the section on aggregated judgments and entering them into the same computer program used to calculate the performance scores for the 20 groups of subjects. This produced 22 sets of performance scores. The best performance scores (independent of group) for each of the 20 groups were noted, the median performance scores (independent of group) for each of the 20 groups was noted, and the performance scores for each of the mathematically derived answers were noted. The resulting performance measures are displayed in Table 2 .
Under most conditions, a nonparametric measure of association like Kendall's Tau or Spearman's Rho might be an appropriate statistic for a test of a hypothesis as the one stated earlier. This could be used to compare the relationship between the actual and predicted orders of performance for each criterion. The fact that one of the performance scores (the best actual value) is by definition greater than another of the scores (the median actual value) makes the use of nonparametric measures of association inappropriate. One alternative testing technique that can be used in this case makes the assumption that the six separate measures of performance constitute six independent trials of a Bernoulli type experiment.
1 A success would be considered to be a situation in which the observed order of the performance measures exactly matches the order in the alternative hypothesis.
There are 12 possible orders of scores for each of the performance measures. Given the assumption (implied by the null hypothesis) that the order of performance scores is random, the probability of a success, p, in the Bernoulli trial is .083 = 1/12 (There are only 12 possible orders because of the restriction that best actual result is by definition larger than median actual result). As can be seen from Table 2 , the observed ranking on the performance measures falls very close to the predicted ranking. Only in two cases, stock price and return on assets, was there a ranking that did not exactly follow the hypothesized order, and the differences from the predicted orders were due to relatively small differences in the dependent measures in those cases. The probability of an outcome as extreme as the one observed, given an assumption about the independence of each of the measures of performance, is .00062. This is the sum of the binomial probabilities for four successes, five successes, and six successes with a probability of success of .083. The maximum probability of an outcome as extreme as this one is .083, which is based on the assumption that all six rank orders can be perfectly predicted by any one rank order. However, the probability of a result as extreme as this one must be smaller than .083 because there are three rank orders displayed in the results. These results can be seen as support of the assertion that the techniques given are useful in the assistance of complex decision making.
Another interesting fact about the results is that they show that the aggregation techniques are even better than they appear at first glance. The performance results for the statisticized responses are attributable to one set of decisions, while the performance results for the best and median groups are attributable to more than one set of decisions. In other words, the "best" results are taken from a number of groups, not just a single group. The decisions derived from aggregation techniques are like decathletes competing against specialists in particular track or field events. The decathletes are not the best on any individual area of competition, but they are notable in that they are quite good on a number of areas of competition simultaneously. In summary, mathematical aggregation techniques seem to be worth pursuing as a way of improving complex group decision making.
DISCUSSION
Comparison of the performance of the mathematically created decisions with the decisions of actual groups paints a favorable picture for the use of the statistical techniques for combining judgments of groups to improve complex decision making. The mathematically created decisions outperformed those of the groups with median performance on all performance measures except one, and on that measure they were quite close. Such results echo the findings made by a number of other researchers who have examined the ability of mathematical models to improve individual decision making (Dawes, 1971 (Dawes, , 1974 Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Goldberg, 1970) .
There are two additional things that this research has accomplished that previous research has not. First, this research has applied mathematical models for decision making to a much more complex class of decision problems. There are many problems like this in the realm of management. Second, the judgments made were ones for which interactions between the separate parts of a whole had to be considered for a superior solution to be achieved.
PROBLEMS
This test of mathematical aggregation techniques is not without its problems. The incentive scheme used in the experiment, for example, would be difficult to apply in a real decision situation. Second, one cannot replay reality a number of times with a number of different decisions to see which group has the best answer. In a field setting, a group's actions could be more motivated by gaming the aggregation scheme than with making the correct decision. Another problem would be the random assignment of persons to decision groups. In an actual organization, it might be difficult to assign managers at random.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Given the preceding discussion, I would offer four suggestions for future research. First, I would suggest the important notion that the use of these techniques be applied to other complex decision situations, such as other management simulations of the type used here. The application of the techniques to other situations will help to determine the extent of their external validity. Second, I would suggest the use of other schemes for aggregating the opinions of the groups. One suggestion would be a weighting scheme for giving more impact to some opinions than others. Such schemes have been discussed in statistics as a way of improving on the traditional estimators for the moments of a distribution (see Hoaglin, Mosteller, & Tukey, 1983 , chapters 10 through 12 and Mosteller & Tukey, 1977 , chapters 10 and 14 for a discussion on robust estimators of location). Weighting schemes are also discussed in the context of individual decision making in Ferrell (1985) and in Sniezek and Henry (1990) . Third, I would suggest a comparison of the quality of aggregations of the responses of individuals with aggregations of the responses of groups composed of those individuals. Research of this type would reveal two things: (a) the degree to which the intermediate step of group discussion is necessary if aggregation is used and (b) more about the ways in which individual opinions are combined into group opinions. Finally, I would suggest a research scheme in which the performance of the best and median actual groups are compared with the performance of mathematical techniques over multiple time periods. Groups would make their own decisions, and then they would make decisions for a firm that was being run by mathematically generated decisions. Hogarth and Makridakis (1981) used a similar scheme in which they compared the performance of two sets of decision rules to the performance of a number of groups in a multiperiod marketing simulation. A Dougan / MATHEMATICAL AGGREGATION STRATEGIES 205
